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8 August 1952

TO: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADMINISTRATION)

FROM: Chief, Administrative Staff (Special)

SUBJECT: General Observations on CIA Organization

Tab I

1. DISCUSSION.

a. The Organization of CIA, set forth in memorandum of 15 July 1952, contemplates a single overseas clandestine service with a single chain of command and a single set of administrative procedures.

b. At the same time, the over-all organization of CIA contemplates the continuation of the concept of centralized administration under a Deputy Director for Administration directing and supervising a series of administrative offices each representing a precise area of administration such as Personnel, Finance, Services, Procurement, etc.

c. These central administrative offices are responsible for providing the supporting administrative services to the operating service, for developing Agency administrative policies and procedures, and for ensuring compliance with such policies and procedures. Lastly, to these offices, basic administrative authorizations have been delegated.

d. This balance of authority and responsibility as between Operations and Administration is unquestionably essential and has been affirmed and reaffirmed as Agency policy. Both experience and elementary facts of human nature prove that proper objectivity and balance are unobtainable in a governmental activity whose objectives are so vital and where the motivations for accomplishment are so intense, unless there is a reasonably authoritative administrative command separate from operations.

e. To the extent that the clandestine activities of CIA can be carried out under authorities and procedures prescribed by published Agency regulations, and to the extent that field installations or operators have the competence and capability to conduct their operations in accordance with CIA regulations, there is no incompatibility between the concept of a single operational chain of command and a separate chain of administrative command.

f. It is a fact, however, that it is impossible to prescribe a set of Agency regulations and administrative procedures which are sufficiently all encompassing to accommodate the infinite variety of operational circumstances encountered in the conduct of covert operations. Not only is it impossible in the complete sense but it is undesirable to even attempt to do so to the maximum degree as this would result in the frustration in the use of operational ingenuity, would constitute a serious security hazard, and would impose an impossible procedural burden on field

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g. To this problem must be added the fact that the nature of CIA's operations requires the delegation of extraordinary operational authority to a large body of widely dispersed individuals, most of whom can not be directly supported by adequate numbers of administrative specialists. This situation necessitates recognition of an infinite range of personal judgments as to urgency, necessity and propriety and therefore accordingly requires extraordinary flexibility in administrative concepts.

h. Under these conditions, many years of experience have shown us clearly and unequivocally that where the standard Agency authorities and regulations are silent on various points, are excessively exacting in their procedural requirements or are not appropriate to the particular operational circumstances, the operating official follows one or more of the following courses of action:

- (1) Ignores or violates existing authorities, regulations and procedures.
- (2) Avoids or evades the regulations by misrepresentation or concealment.
- (3) Petitions the administrative command for relief, special authorizations, or for the revision of offending regulations.

i. The frequency of violation or avoidance of regulations and the perpetual complaints as to the inflexibility and lack of timeliness of the administrative response to operational needs is evidence of deficiencies in administrative machinery. Likewise, the fact that the Agency is frequently forced to condone (although it may deplore) violations of regulations because of obvious operational justification and urgency indicates again that unresponsiveness of Administration is a basic deficiency. This reluctant post-facto acceptance of improper acts is particularly significant since it results in deterioration of Agency discipline and degeneration of administrative standards.

j. In summary, violation or avoidance of regulations, or unresponsiveness of administration to the requirements of clandestine operations breeds friction and conflict. The history of CIA and predecessor organizations supports this fact and proves that the single greatest point of internal friction has been and is between the chain of operational command and the chain of administrative command. The operators in a small area of their activities often find Agency regulations inadequate, too exhaustive in procedural requirements, or too restrictive. They accuse the administrative command of bureaucracy, lack of understanding and ignorance. They have claimed that it is an affront to the command concept to have to petition the administrative command for special authorities needed to carry out an approved operational determination. In particular, they complain that to get a new regulation, a special authorization or a modification in Agency procedures from the administrative command of CIA, involves a delay of weeks to months. To the extent that these complaints have been valid, administration has failed in its support of Operations.

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k. In defense of the administrative command, there is much to be said. The operating offices have been lax in training and requiring their personnel to comply with Agency regulations. In addition, due to secrecy standards of the operating offices, the unavoidable inadequacy of world-wide communications, and the somewhat justifiable fear that the operator may be misrepresenting or concealing facts, administrative officials whose authorities are sought not only lack adequate information on which to make a determination but are sometimes justified in being dubious about alleged facts provided.

1. The only solution to this problem is to ensure that administrative regulations, procedures, and sense of timeliness are fully responsive to the needs of covert operations. In my opinion, this requires that the DDA have a supplementary staff and specialized administrative machinery to focus administrative attention on this area. The normal administrative offices of CIA can and should constitute and provide the basic administrative staff and machinery required. The supplementary DDA staff and administrative machinery should only be utilized to focus administrative attention on problems of great administrative complexity or urgency.

m. The fact that the functional duties of each CIA administrative office are becoming increasingly well defined, and the fact that coordinated administrative determinations are not properly required merely augments the need for special staff machinery to expedite, coordinate administrative determinations, to ensure administrative flexibility and responsiveness, and to generate new administrative concepts.

2. CONCLUSIONS.

a. In summary, it is inevitable that the organizational balance between Operations and Administration and the nature and circumstances of CIA clandestine operations produce friction. The writer believes that the most difficult and important function of the DDA is to keep such friction to the minimum consistent with the maintenance of reasonable administrative standards.

b. To accomplish this, the DDA must have both machinery and a staff which will accomplish the following:

- (1) Ensure early participation of Administration in the planning of the support and administrative aspects of complex projects.
- (2) Alert the DDA to deficiencies in administrative policies, competence or capabilities.
- (3) Develop and implement new policies, procedures and facilities as, and not after, operational developments require and warrant them.

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- (4) Exert continuing administrative pressures to ensure that all administrative offices vigorously fulfill their responsibilities in the area of clandestine operations on a timely basis.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS.


a. It is recommended that a thorough study be made as to the need and form of supplementary administrative machinery and staff, and that formal provision therefor be made in the Agency organization and regulations. Proper delineation of the purposes of such machinery and the duties of such a staff are deemed essential to its effective performance.

b. No specific recommendations are made as to the above but the writer believes that the existent CCC and Administrative Staff (Special) are currently fulfilling part of the existent requirements. To the extent that the CCC and parts of the Administrative Staff (Special) may be retained, it is recommended that they be revised pursuant to the first recommendation.

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